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1.  Introduction:  the  economic  and historical  perspective 
The  Commission's  White  Paper  on  completing  the  internal  market  of  the 
Community(l)  was  a  response  to  the  need  to  reverse  the  relative  decline of 
western  Europe.  The  undertaking  is  an  ambitious  one  - to  some  perhaps 
frighteningly  so  - but  it had  to  be  ambitious  if it was  to  measure  up  to 
the  scale  of  what  is  needed.  And  the  Governments  of the  Member  States have 
firmly  and  repeatedly  committed  themselves  to  fulfilling  those  ambitions. 
They  had  already  been  searching  for  some  time  for  a  strategy  - a  strategy 
which  would  revive  the  entire  economy  of  Europe  and  reverse  the  process  of 
the  previous  decade  or  more  which  had  caused  our  performance  in  terms  of 
output  to  fall  increasingly  behind  those  of our  main  competitors  in  America 
and  Japan. 
Their  recognition  that  the  solution  was  to  be  found  in  the  completion  of 
the  internal  market  goes  back  as  far  as  the Copenhagen  European  Council  in 
December  1982 and was reaffirmed atDubl:in  and  Fontainebleau  in  1984. 
The  Commission  took  up  the  challenge  and  gave  it more  concrete  expression 
by  declaring in the  European  Parliament  in  January  1985 that within  8  years 
- the  life  of  two  Commissions  - a  programme  for  the  dismantlement  of  the 
Community's  internal  frontiers  would  be  drawn  up  and  implemented. 
The  population  of  the  European  Community  is  nearly  half  as  large again  as 
that  of  the  United  States  and  well  over  twice  that  of  Japan.  We  are  the 
biggest  and  oldest-established  bloc  of  trading  nations  in  the  world.  Our 
scientific knowledge  and  our  capacity  for  invention are  second  to none.  But 
for  want  of  ~  dynamic  regenerative  impetus  these  immense  resources  in  con-
siderable  measure  lie  fa!' low,  failing  to  produce  the  growth  and  the  rich 
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harvest  of  prosperity  of  which  they are intrinsically capable.  Perhaps  the 
starkest  measure  of  the  extent  of the  waste  and  of the  urgency  of the  need 
for  action  is that,  meanwhile,  16  million  potential  producers  of wealth  and 
growth  stand  unemployed.  The  simple  truth  is  that  we  are  failing  to  make 
use  of the  immense  potential  which  Europe  possesses. 
What  is  the  reason  for  this  tragic  waste  of  opportunity  and  potential? 
The  Community 
1 s  Heads  of  State  and  Government  had  long  sensed  that  the 
answer  lay  in  the  disunity  which  still,  nearly  30  years  after the  signing 
of the  Treaty of Rome,  marked  the  European  economy  itself.  The  countries of 
the  European  Community,  for  all  their common  heritage  and  common  interest, 
remain  a  fragmented  economy,  divided  into  a  dozen  separate  markets;  each 
with  its  own  rules;  each  manufacturing  for  its  own  market;  each  facing 
obstacles  and  difficulties  in  trying  to  trade  with  other  Member  States. 
That  is  why  the  Community  has  steadily  fallen  behind  the  more  integrated 
markets  of  the  United  States  and  Japan  in  the  growth  of  its  demand,  its 
production  and  its trade. 
The  Heads  of  State  and  Government,  meeting  in  March  1985  in  Brussels,  set 
the  target and  the objective  by  identifying as  their first priority "action 
to  achieve  a  single  large  market  by  1992  thereby  creating a  more  favourable 
environment  for  stimulating  enterprise,  competition  and  trade;  it called 
upon  the  Commission  to  draw  up  a  detailed  programme  with  a  specific 
timetable  before  its next  meeting". 
The  Commission's  blueprint  in  response  to  this  challenge  was  rapid,  bold 
and  radical.  It has  since  been  universally  accepted  as  the  foundation  for  a 
rebirth of  European  aspirations.  The  White  Paper  on  completing  the  internal 
market did not  mince  its words: 
"Europe  stands at the cross-roads.  We  either go  ahead  - with  resolution and 
determination  - or  we  drop  back  into mediocrity.  We  can  now  either resolve 
to  complete  the  integration  of  the  economies  of  Europe;  or  through  a  lack 
of  political  will  to  face  the  immense  problems  involved,  we  can  simply 
allow  Europe  to  develop into  no  more  than  a  free  trade area. 
The  difference  is  crucial.  A  well-developed  free  trade  area  offers 
significant  advantages:  it  is  something  much  better  than  that  which 
existed  before  the  Treaty  of  Rome;  better  even  than  that  which  exists 
today.  But  it would  fail  and  fail  dismally  to  release  the  energies of the '•: 
.  ':  '•" 
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people  of Europe;  it would  fail  to  deploy  Europe's  immense  resources  to  the 
maximum  advantage;  and  it  would  fail  to  satisfy  the  aspirations  of  the 
people  of Europe." 
The  White  Paper  and  its programme  were  welcomed  and  largely  endorsed  by  the 
European  Council  meeting  in  Milan  in  June  1985.  Six  months  later  saw  the 
adoption  of. the Single  European  Act  which  establishes  as  a  legal  commitment 
the  objective  of  ~·an  area  without  internal  frontiers  in  which  the  free 
movement  of  goods,  persons,  services  and  capital  is  ensured."  A  Europe 
without  internal  frontiers  - not  a  Europe  with  fewer  or  simpler  frontier 
controls,  but  one  with  no  such  divisive  frontier  controls  at  all.  The 
_programme  in  the  White  Paper  is for  a  comprehensive  elimination of all the 
barriers  - the . physical  barriers,  the  technical  barriers  and  the  fiscal 
barriers  - which  cause  the  face  of  Europe  to  be  scarred  hy  the  frontiers 
which  divide  it.  One  of  the  declarations  that  accompanied  the  Single 
European  Act  made  specific  reference  to  "decisions  necessary  to  implement 
the  Commission's  programme  described  in  the  White  Paper  on  the  Internal 
Market". 
The  Commission  and  the  Governments  of  the  Member  States  are  therefore 
firmly  committed  to  embark  on  the  completion of the  programme. 
2.  Completing the  Internal  Market:  the  fiscal  aspects 
The  Commission  has .taken  as  its  starting  point  a  snapshot  of the existing 
wide  spread  of  indirect  tax  rates  and  structures  in  the  Community.  It has 
then  confined  itself to  setting  out  the  minimum  changes  which  must  be  made 
to  that  picture  in  order  to  achieve  a  sufficient  degree  of  fiscal 
approximation.  It  must  be  clearly  understood  that  the  present  package  is 
not  an  attempt  to  design  an  ideal  fiscal  system  for  the  Community,  but  a 
blueprint  for  ab~litiory  of  fiscal  frontiers.  It is  in  that spirit that  the 
Commission  has  tried  to  find  the  most  practical  possible  solutions;  and  it 
is  in  that spirit,  and  taking possible  problems  of adjustment  into account, 
that  they  are·-pr~~ented  and  must  be  studied.  That  is  the  job  which  the 
Commission  was 'as:~e~ \o do.. 
···~  - .·  -
Already  in  rhian ;:in  Juri.e  1985,  the  European  Council  launched  an  intensive 
programme  of  activity . based  on  the  White  Paper  proposals.  As  far  as  the 
fiscal  chapter ·. (Part  III)  was  concerned,  the  Milan  conclusions  stated:  "As - 4  -
regards. the  approximation  of  VAT  and  excise  duties,  the  European  Council 
invited  the  Council  of  Ministers  for  Financial Affairs  (ECOFIN)  to  examine 
on  the  basis  of  the  White  Paper  any  measures  which  might  be  necessary  for 
the  achievement  of  a  single  market  and  the  possible  timetable  for  the 
application of those  measures." 
The  ECOFIN  Council  delegated  this  mandate  in  the  first  instance  to  a 
high-level  group  of  fiscal  experts  who,  together  with  representatives  of 
the  Commission,  considered  the fiscal  proposals outlined  in  the  White  Paper 
and  the  possible  alternatives  to  it.  The  high-level  group  reported  to  the 
ECOFIN  Council  in  June  1986  that  the  proposal  would  achieve  the  removal 
of  formalities  and  fiscal  controls  at  borders  in  the  case  of  intra-
Community  trade  and  that  the alternatives  they  had  considered  would  fail to 
result  in  the  removal  of  fiscal  frontiers  and  could  not,  therefore,  be 
recommended.  Nevertheless,  the  report  also  made  it clear  that  there  were 
still  considerable  difficulties,  uncertainties  and  hesitations,  and 
concluded  that  "Member  States  will  not  be  able  to  decide  whether  the 
measures  envisaged  by  the  Commission  are  ultimately  acceptable  to  them 
until  full  details  of  the  measures  as  a  whole  are  available.  Only  when 
Member  States  can  see  clearly 
the  financial,  budgetary,  economic  and  social  consequences  of  the 
measures  for  them, 
- the  practical  consequences  for  both  the  economy  and  individuals  and  the 
national  budget  entailed  by  the  clearing mechanism, 
will  each  of  them  be  in  a  position  to  weigh  up  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  resulting  from  the  Commission's  system  and  decide  whether it 
is  prepared  to  agree  to  the  system." 
The  ECOFIN  Council  in  June  1986  discussed  the  group's  conclusions  and 
reserved  its  position  until  the  Commission  had  subml tted  to  the  Council 
"detailed  proposals  on  the  rates  and  rate  structure  of  indirect  taxation 
and  on  the  clearing  syste~ On  that basis the  Member  States will  be  able -to 
state  their position on  the  approach  which  the  Comm]ssion  envisages  in  Part 
III of the  White  Paper". 
This  Communication  provides  the  detailed  proposals  for  which  ECOFIN  have 
asked.  It  constitutes  the  beginning  of  the  next,  and  probably  most - 5  -
decisive,  phase  of  this  dialogue.  As  is clear  from  the  conclusions of the 
high-level  group  and  the  ECOFIN  Council,  the process of fiscal  integration 
cannot  begin  in  earnest  until  the  Member  States have  had  an  opportunity to 
assess what  fiscal approximation will mean  to them  in real  terms.  Only  when 
a  clear  and  coherent  set  of  proposals  for  fiscal  approximation  is  on  the 
Council  table  will  the  Member  States  be  in  a  position  to  weigh  up  the 
implications  for  themselves,  and  to  determine  what  benefits  and  what  costs 
they  offer  to  each  of  them  in  their  own  particular  circumstances,  both  in 
the  shorter and  the  longer  term. 
Neither  the  Commission  nor  the  Member  States  have  ever  had  any  illusion 
about  the  magnitude  and  the  difficulty of  the  task  ahead.  But  they  have  not 
hitherto  been  in  a  position  to  measure·  it.  The  present  proposals  are  the 
basis  on  which  that  task  of  analysis,  of  evaluation  and  of  eventual 
adjustment  can  now  take  place.  Every  effort  will  need  to  be  made  to  find 
Community  solutions  to difficulties that may  arise.  If that should  prove  in 
some  cases  to  be  impossible,  the  Commission  is prepared  to  examine  with  the 
Member  States  concerned  what  special  measures  might  be  applied  to  them. 
Such  measures  would  have  to  be  of  a  temporary  nature  and  must  cause  the 
least  possible  disturbance  to  the  functioning  of  the  Common  Market.  The 
Commission  could  then  propose  appropriate  solutions to  the  Council,  notably 
as  provided  for  in Article  8C  of the  Treaty  as  amended  by  the  Single 
European  Act. 
As  is  discussed  in  more  detail  later  in  this  paper,  the  path  to  abolition 
of  fiscal  frontiers  in  1992  will  be  an  easier one  to tread  for  some  Member 
States  than  for  others.  Some  aspects  may  cause  extreme  difficulty  in  some 
cases,  for  example  in  Member  States  whose  budgetary  receipts  would  be 
significantly  reduced  or  increased.  The  Community  as  a  whole  - the  Member 
States  and  the  Commission  working  together  - wi 11  have  to  find  ways, 
including  the  possibility  of  derogations  where  these  can  be  justified,  of 
easing  the  path  for  those  of  its  members  for  whom  the  implementations  of 
the  proposals  could  pose  political,  social  or  budgetary  problems.  The 
proposals  already  provide  a  major  element  of  flexibility;  it is  proposed 
that  Member  States  be  given  freedom  to  determine  their own  path  to  1992  and 
the  pace  at which  they  travel  along it.  The  Council  and  the  Commission  will 
monitor  the  pattern  of  progress  and  may  propose  solutions  to  difficulties 
which  manifest  themselves.  The  Commission  will  consider the  possibility of 
proposing  complementary  measures  at  a  later  date,  which  would  enable  the 
measures  proposed  here  to  be  amended  on  a  Community  basis  if  economic 
developments  were  to  make  that  desirable.  This  would  enable  any  limitation - 6  -
which  fisce.l  approximation  might  impose  on  Member  States'  flexibility  of 
response  to  be  compensated  for at a  Community  level. 
All  this,  however,  is  yet  to  come.  The  immediate  task  for  the  Community  is 
to  study  the  proposals  which  accompany  this  communication  and  for  each  of 
its Members  to  evaluate  their significance. 
3.  The  Proposals 
The  White  Paper  demonstrated  that  if fiscal  frontiers  are  to  be  abolished 
and  the  indirect  taxation  system  of  the  Community  is  to  serve  the  single 
unified  market  which  we  are  committed  to  completing,  there  must  be  a 
considerable  measure  of  approximation  of  indirect  taxes.  Only  then,  when 
indirect  tax  levels  are  sufficiently  close  as  between  one  Member  State  and 
another  so  as  not  to distort competition  and  patterns of trade,  will it be 
possible  for  the  European  economy  to  work  in  a  free  and  unfettered  way; 
only  then  will  goods,  services,  capital  and  people  be  able  to  move  freely 
to  where  they  enjoy  genuine  comparative  and  competitive  advantage:.  If  we 
are  to  abolish  the  internal  frontiers  which  at  present  divide  us,  it is 
vi tal  to  deal  with  fiscal  frontiers  and  the  underlying  reasons  for  their 
existence.  This  is  not  a  new  dawning  of  the  truth.  It  is  something  which 
has  been  accepted  ever since  the  founding  of the  Community:  and  it has  been 
re-affirmed  on  many  subsequent  occasions,  not least in the  Single  European 
Act  itself. 
The  abolition  of  fiscal  frontiers  will  bring  with  it  the  abolition  for 
intra-Community  trade  of the  existing system of relieving goods  from  tax at 
export  and  of  imposing  tax  at  import,  as  has  indeed  been  envisaged  ever 
since  the  First  VAT  Directive  was  adopted  twenty  years  ago.  Elimination of 
the distinction  made  at present  between  supplies within  a  Member  States  and 
supplies  to  another  Member  State  should  result  in  significant  adminis-
trative  simplification for  traders. 
In  addition,  the  removal  of  fiscal  frontiers  necessitates  approximation of 
VAT  and  the  main  excise  duties  if  unacceptable  levels  of  distortion  of 
competition,  diversion of trade,  and  tax  fraud  are  to  be  avoided. 
The  Commission  is  also  proposing  a  VAT  clearing  mechanism  to  ensure  that, 
after  frontier  controls  have  been  abolished,  the  Member  States continue  to - 7  -
receive  the  revenue  to  which  they are entitled.  It will ensure  that output 
tax  collected  on  export  sales  in  one  Member  State  is  passed  on  to  the 
Member  Stat·es  in  which  the  supplies  are  finally  consumed.  The  mechanism  is 
described  in detail  in a separate Working  Paper  but  is in essence  a  central 
account  through  which  Member  States  will  draw  or  pay  money  periodically, 
depending  on  the  extent  to  which  they  are  net  importers  or  exporters. 
Member  States  will  calculate  the  amount  to  be  drawn  from  or  paid  to  the 
central  account  on  the  basis  of  information  supplied  in  traders'  VAT 
returns.  No  additional  records  will  need  to  be  kept.  For  excise duties,  no 
such  system  is  needed,  since  these  are  not  charged  until  the  goods  are 
released  from  bond,  normally  in  the  country  in  which  they  are  to  be  sold  to 
the  final  consumer. 
There  are,  of  course,  other  indirect  taxes  within  the  Community,  such  as 
taxes  on  the  registration of vehicles,  and  on  the  purchase of houses,  which 
vary  considerably  from  Member  State  to  Member  State.  Those  variations  can 
be  such  as  to cause distortions of competition  and  deflection of trade.  But 
they  do  not  impede  the  free  movement  of  goods  in  the  sense  that  the 
differences  between  them  do  not  give  rise  to  controls  or  formalities  at 
frontiers.  The  Commission  actively  pursues  cases  in  which  such  indirect 
taxes  breach  the  rules  of  the  Treaty,  but  does  not consider their approxi-
mation  to  be  a  necessary  part of the  abolition of fiscal  frontiers. 
In  adopting  its  approach  to  the  elimination  of  fiscal  frontiers,  based  on 
the  notion  of  the  sufficient  approximation  of  the  existing  patterns  of 
indirect  taxation  in  the  Member  States,  the  Commission  is  strictly  imple-
menting Articie. 99 of -the  Treaty as amended by ·tne· Single-Europe1m Act.  'IhatArticle 
calls  for  proposals  "for  the  harmonisation  of  legislation  concerning 
turnover  taxes,  excise  duties  and  other  forms  of  indirect  taxation  to the 
extent that  such harmonisation  is necessary  to  ensure  the  establishment and 
the  functioning  of  the  internal  market  within  the  time  limit  laid  down  in 
Article  SA  ( ie,  1992)".  The  Commission  has  refrained  from  proposing 
anything  which  is  not  strictly  necessary  for  that  purpose.  There  are 
pressures  from  one  quarter  or  another  to  use  the  approximation  process  as  a 
vehicle  for  achieving  other  fiscal  changes  or  even  non-fiscal  policy 
objectives.  The  Commission  considers,  however,  that  it  would  not  be 
justified  in  seeking  to  place  additional  strains  of  adaptation  on  Member 
States  in  this  way.  Every  effort has  been  made  to  avoid  running counter to 
other policy objectives,  and  to bear  the wider  economic  social  and  regional 
implications  in  mind  in  formulating  these  proposals.  But  these  are  among 
the  implications  which  can  only  be  evaluated  on  the  basis  of a  collective '• 
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consideration  of  the  proposals.  In  what  will  be  a  challenging  period  of 
transition,  the  Commission  has  concentrated  on  two  overriding  priorities: 
its  proposals  must  result  in  the  best  possible  fiscal  environment  for 
economic  operators  in  the  internal  market;  at  the  same  time  they  must 
minimize  the  adverse  effects  of  the  approximation  exercise  for  Member 
States'  revenue  flows  and  budget  flexibility.  This  document  sets  out  in 
general  terms  the  Commission's  proposals  for  a  manageable  level  of approxi-
mation.  The  specific proposals  in question are  listed  in  Annex  A. 
For  ease  of  analysis,  VAT  and  the  excise  duties  are  dealt with  separately 
in  the  following  two  sections. 
4.  Approximation of VAT  rates and  rate.structure 
The  First 
foundations 
and  Second  VAT  Directives, 
of  the  Community  VAT  system, 
which  laid  down  in  1967  the 
already  clearly  envisaged  the 
abolition  of  tax  on  imports  and  the  remission  of  tax  on  exports  in  trade 
between  Member  States  and  the  approximation  of  legislation  concerning 
turnover  taxes  in  order  to  eliminate distortion of competition within  the 
Community.  This  objective  has  been  repeatedly  confirmed  over  the  years. 
Considerable  progress  has  been  made  towards  the  creation  of  a  common  VAT 
base,  notably  with  the  adoption  of  the  Sixth  VAT  Directive.  The  Sixth 
Directive  lays  down,  in  particular,  a  clear  programme  for  the  staged 
introduction  of  the  fiscal  conditions  permitting  the  internal  market  to 
function.  That  programme  is  already  under  way.  The  Commission  has  put 
forward  several  proposals  - notably  the  Seventh,  Twelfth,  Eighteenth  and 
Nineteenth  Draft  Directives  - designed  to  eliminate  some  of  the  most 
significant  remaining  areas  of  divergence.  The  Council  should  deal  with 
these  proposals  as  a  matter  of  urgency.  Certain  derogations  have  not yet 
been  tackled.  More  is said of these  questions  later in this  Communication. 
Nonetheless,  there  now  exists  an  identifiable  common  VAT  base  which 
represents  a  decisive  step  along  the  road  towards  a  common  fiscal  system 
and  thus  towards  the  elimination of fiscal  frontiers. 
a)  Number  of rates 
The  starting  point  for  any  approach  to  the  approximation  of  both  the 
number  and  level  of  VAT  rates  must  be  the  existing  situation  in  the 
Member  States.  This  is  as  follows: - 9  -
Reduced  Standard  Increased 
f'ates·  rate  rate 
Belgium  ( 1)  ( 2)  1  &  6  19  25  &  25+8 
Denmark  ( 1)  22 
France  2.1;  4 
5.5 & 7  18.60  33  1/3 
Germany  7  14 
Greece  6  18  36 
Ireland  (1)  2.4 & 10  25 
Italy  {1)  2  &  9  18  38 
Luxembourg  3  & 6  12 
Netherlands  6  20 
Portugal  (1)  8  16  30 
Spain  6  12  33 
United  Kingdom  ( 1)  15 
Rates  applicable  as at 1.4.1987 
From  the  above  it  can  be  seen  that  all  Member  States,  with  the 
exception  of  Denmark  and  the  UK,  apply  more  than  one  rate.  Thus, 
although  the  Commission  accepts  that,  in theory,  a  VAT  system  with  only 
one  rate is the  simplest  and  most efficient structure,  it is clear that 
such  an  approach  would  have  disruptive  consequences  for  all  Member 
States,  other  than  the  two  mentioned,  and  is unlikely  to  be  acceptable 
to  the  Community  as  a  whole.  It is therefore  proposed  that  a  multi-rate 
system  should  be  adopted. 
{1)  Also  applies  an  exemption  with  a  right to  refund  (ie a 
zero-rate)  to certain dcmestic  transactions  (NB  all 
Member  States  apply  the  zero rate for  exports  and  like 
transactions) . 
(~)  Al~o ApplleA  An  intArmodint~ rnto or  17% - 10  -
The  question  of  how  many  rates  a  Community  multi-rate  system  should 
have  is  less  clear  cut.  Whilst  a  majority  of  Member  States have  three 
or  more  rates,  in  practice  they fall  into  two  main  camps,  namely  those 
with  a  standard  and  a  reduced  rate  or  rates  and  those  with  standard, 
reduced  and  increased  rates.  Taking  into  account  the  fact  that,  where 
Member  States  have  more  than  three  rates  the  more  extreme  rates 
normally  apply  to  only  a  very  limited  number  of  products,  the  real 
choice lies between  a  two-rate  and ·a  three-rate system. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  a  three-rate  system  creates  more  complica-
tions  for  both  taxpayers  and  national  administrations  and  that it would 
therefore  be  simpler  and  more  cost-effective  to  move  to  a  two-rate 
system than  to oblige  those  Member  States  who  currently  do  not  apply  an 
increased  rate  to  move  to  a  three-rate  system.  Furthermore,  since  the 
existing  increased  rates  are  applied  to  a  relatively  small  proportion 
·of  the  tax  base  in  each  Member  State  (on  average  below  10%),  their 
abolition  would  not  create  undue  budgetary  problems.  Finally,  the 
coverage  of  existing  increased  rates  is  not  particularly  homogeneous 
and  it  would  therefore  be  difficult  objectively  to  draw  up  a  common 
list  of  goods  and  services  which  should  be  subjected  to  an  increased 
rate.  For  all  these  reasons,  the  Commission  has  concluded  that  a 
two-rate  system  would  be  preferable  - namely  a  system  with  a  standard 
rate  and  a  reduced rate only. 
b)  Scope  of  the  reduced rate 
In  most  Member  States  the  coverage  of  the  reduced  rate  or  rates  is 
generally  restricted  to  i terns  of  basic  necessity.  The  zero-rates  in 
Ireland  and  the  United  Kingdom  cover  much  the  same  ground.  Taking  this 
into  account,  there  is  a  considerable  degree  of  consistency  in  the 
different  Member  States.  The  Commission  proposes  therefore  that  the · 
following  basic  goods  and  services  should  be  taxed  at  a  reduced  rate 
under  the  harmonized  Community  VAT  structure,  but it is  important  to 
read this list in conjunction with what is said at 2d)  below about  zero 
rates. 
-foodstuffs  (with  the  exception of alcoholic  drinks); 
- energy  products  for heating  and  lighting; - 11  -
- supplies of water; 
- pharmaceutical  products; 
- books,  newspapers  and  periodicals; 
passenger  transport. 
Overall,  these  i terns  represent  approximately  one  third  of  the  common 
Community  tax  base. 
c)  Rate  levels 
The  standard rates  currently applied  in  the  Member  States vary  from  12% 
(Spain  and  Luxembourg)  to  25%  (Ireland).  This  is  clearly  too  wide  a 
band  to  permit  the  abolition  of  fiscal  frontiers  without  serious 
economic  consequences.  The  spread of rates therefore has  to  be  narrowed 
to  a  point  where  the  difference  between  the  upper  and  lower  limits will 
itself  not  create  intolerable  price  differences  between  the  Member 
States  (especially  those  which  are  adjacent).  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Commission  is conscious  that the  narrower  the  band  becomes,  the greater 
is  the  number  of  Member  States  that  will  suffer  budgetary  disruption. 
In  terms  of  the  second  of  these  criteria,  the  optimum  spread  of  the 
standard rate  band  would  be  8  points  (which  would  incorporate  10  out of 
the  12  standard  rates  currently  applied,  within  a  band  from  12%  to 
20%).  Unfortunately,  however,  neighbouring  Member  States  are  to  be 
found  at either end of this spectrum  and  the  Commission  has  been  forced 
to  conclude  that  the  resulting  tax-induced  border  price  differentials 
would  generate  trade  distortions  and  fiscal  fraud,  which  Member  States 
would  be  likely  to  find  unacceptable. 
If,  however,  the  standard  rate  band  were  narrowed  from  8  to  6  points 
there  would  still  be  8  Member  States  who  would  currently  fall  within 
this  range  (if  the  parameters  were  set  at  14%  and  20 •%)  and  the 
resulting  price  differentials  would  become  that  much  less  distortive 
and  more  manageable.  The  Commission  has,  therefore,  concluded  that the 
optimum  norm  for  the  standard  rate  should  be  within  a  permitted  range 
of between  14%  and 20%.  In  fixing their own  individual rate within this 
band,  Member  States  would  need  to  take  into  account  the  effect  of 
market  forces  once  fiscal  frontiers  had  been  eliminated  - and  would,  of 
course,  be  entirely free  to  do  so. - 12  -
Turning  to  the  reduced  rates,  these  currently  vary  from  1%  to  10%  but 
the  lowest  rates\  apply  only  to  a  very  few  products  and  those  with 
significant  coverage  vary  from  4%  to  10%.  On  the  other  hand,  it also 
has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  two  Member  States  currently  apply  a  zero 
rate  to  most,  if  not  all  of  the  basic  goods  and  services  which  are 
included  in  the  list of  items  to  be  taxed  at  the  reduced  rate.  Taking 
these  various  factors  into  account,  the  Commission  has  concluded  that 
the  permitted  range  for  the  reduced  rate  should  be  between  4%  and  9% 
though  in  view  of  the  inclusion  in  this rate  band  of certain sensitive 
sectors,  such  as  the  cultural  sector,  the  Commission  recommends that 
Member  States fix  their rate  in  the  lower half of that band. 
The  weighted  average  VAT  burden  resulting from  these  calculations  (i.e. 
the  total  tax  yield  in  proportion  to the  total harmonized  tax  base)  in 
the  Community  is  currently  around  13%.  The  proposed  rate  bands  will 
permit  Member  States  to  choose  rates which will result  in  a  minimum  of 
disruption  for  the  maximum  number  of  Member  States  in  terms  of  this 
existing  tax  burden.  The  future  weighted  average  VAT  burden  will,  of 
course,  depend  on  the  actual  choices  made  by  the  Member  States within 
the  permitted  bands. 
d)  Derogations,  zero rates  and  exemptions 
The  White  Paper  acknowledged  that  some  countries  would  face  consider-
able  difficulties  with  fiscal  approximation;  and  it  said  that 
derogations  might  be  needed  to  meet  these  problems.  This  is  likely to 
be  of particular  importance  in the  case of zero rating. 
It  has  always  been  an  accepted  part  of  Community  policy  that  zero 
rating,  except  in  the  case  of  exports,  was  a  temporary  measure  which 
would  disappear  with  the  Completion  of  the  Internal  Market.  This  was 
clearly stated  in the  second  VAT  Directive  adopted  in  1967  and  restated 
1n  the  Sixth  VAT  Directive  adopted  in  1977. 
The  zero  rating  of  supplies  generally  acknowledged  as  basic  necess-
ities rests upon  considerations of social policy;  though  it is clearly 
a  less  efficient  way  of  achieving  such  objectives  than  measures  more - 13  -
c 1 •E·ely  targeted  towards  those  in  need.  Only  two  Member  States  have 
followed  such  policies  to  a11y  significant  degree;  the  other  Member 
States  have  successfully  accommodated  themselves  to  a  broadly  based 
concept  of  VAT  without  the  extensive  use  of zero rating.  This  has 
been  achieved  by  direct  compensation  of  disadvantaged  groups  through 
the  social  security  system  and  welfare  payments,  thus  directly  bene-
fiting the  groups  primarily affected  in  a  more  cost-effective  way  than 
is  achieved  by  a  fiscal  price  subsidy.  It should  also  be  remembered 
that  zero  rating,  by  giving  a  price  advantage  to  the  products of one 
Member  State,  distorts  competition  within  the  Community;  this  is 
particularly  true  when  applied  to  supplies  which  feed  through  into 
industrial  and  commercial  costs.  Finally,  it  needs  to  be  remembered 
that,  for  any  given  yield  of  revenue,  zero  rating  in  one  area  must 
inevitably  lead  to  a  higher  overall  rate  of  tax  elsewhere;  if  50% 
o'f  consumer  exp'endi ture  is  exempted  by  zero  rating,  the  rate 
of  tax  elsewhere  necessarily  has  to  be  twice  what  it  would  have 
been if there  had  been  comprehensive  coverage. 
For  all  of  these  reasons,  the  Commission  could  not  recommend  that the 
Community  should  abandon  what  has  been  its  considered  and  settled 
policy  ever  since  the  VAT  was  first  adopted.  It is  for  this  reason, 
that  in  the  rates  and  coverage  proposed  above,  the  Commission  has  not 
proposed  zero  rates,  but  has  proposed  that  for  the  most  part  basic 
necessities  should  be  charged  at  the  reduced  rate,  as  is the  practice 
in  almost all the  Member  States. 
Nevertheless,  the  Commission  accepts  that  some  Member  States  face 
difficulties.  The  Commission  recognises  that  the  Member  States 
concerned  may  well  wish  to  be  granted  derogations  to  meet  their 
particular  difficulties.  Indeed,  this  point  was  clearly recognised  in 
the  White  Paper  itself. 
The  Commission  has  indeed  considered  whether  it should  already at this 
juncture  propose  such  derogations  but  has  come  to  the  clear view  that 
it would  not  in  any  event  be  practicable  to  do  so  unti  1  the  Member 
States  have  had  a  chapce  to  study  its  proposals  and  consider  what 
particular  difficulties  they  may  present.  Though  the  proliferation of 
derogations  would  present  serious  problems  that  could  threaten  the 
operation  of  the  internal  market  and  the  objective  of  abolishing 
fiscal  frontiers,  the  Commission  would  of  course  take  a  constructive - 14  -
part  in  the  discussion  of  any  derogations  for  which  Member  States in 
real difficulty might  feel  the  need.  But  that dialogue  cannot  commence 
until  the  present  proposals  have  been  studied  and  evaluated  by  all 
concerned. 
This  is  not  the  place  to  deploy  at  any  length  the  arguments  for  and 
against  such  derogations.  The  principle  which  needs  to  be  respected 
all  the  time  is  th'e  integrity  of  the  Internal  Market.  Clearly  where 
trade  between  Member  States  inevitably  involves  significant additional 
costs,  it  may  well  be  possible  for  the  market  to  accommodate  cost 
differences  resulting  from  derogations  without  too  much  risk  of 
deflection  or  distortion of  trade.  But  where  cross-border  shopping  is 
easy  and  involves'  of  itself  no  significant  additional  costs, 
derogations  might  well  create  significant distortions.  For  this reason 
also  derogations  are  not  simply  a  matter  concerning  the  Member  States 
asking  for  the derogation,  but  concern  also  the  other  Member  States. 
The  second  point  which  needs  to  be  made  is  that  derogations  always 
carry  a  cost- which  ultimately  is borne  primarily  by  the  Member  State 
concerned.  The  objective  of  the  Completion  of  the  Internal  Market  is 
to  reduce  actual  and  identifiable  costs  arising  from  the  present 
frontier controls,  and  to  give  industry  a  more  cost-effective basis  on 
which  to  conduct  its  operations  by  having  access  to  an  undivided 
market  of  320  million  instead  of primarily  to  its own  domestic  market 
only.  Derogations  may  well  lead  neighbouring  Member  States  to  j nsist 
on  the  maintenance  of  frontier  controls  directed specifically against 
the  Member  State concerned.  It would  be  a  tragedy  for  the  Community  as 
a  whole  and  in particular  for  the  Member  State  concerned if by  its own 
policies it forced  itself into a  position where  effectively it had  cut 
itself  off  from  the  overwhelming  benefits  which  will  flow  from  the 
integrated  European  market. 
A  word  should  also  be  said  here  about  exemptions.  The  Sixth  VAT 
Directive,  in  laying  down  the  basic  principles  of  the  tax  base, 
designated  certain  supplies  as  in  principle  exempt  but  gave  Member 
States  the· option  to  continue  to  tax  some  of  them  on  a  transitional 
basis.  Others  were  to  be  in  principle  taxable,  but  again  as  a 
transitional  measure,  Member  States were  allowed  to  continue  to  exempt - 15  -
them.  The  draft  Eighteenth  VAT  Directive,  still before  the  Council, 
seeks  in  the  interests  of  fair  competition  within  a  single  internal 
market  to  bring  many  of  these  transitional options  to  an  end  - either 
as  permanent  exemptions  or  by  bringing  the  supplies  concerned 
definitively  into  the  tax  net;  others  remain  to  be  settled at  a  later 
stage, including the treatrrent of  gold  (other than  for  indusflrial use) and of 
works  of  art,  where  further  thought  needs  to  be  given  to  what  the 
definitive  regime  should  be.  Further  proposals  will  therefore  be 
needed,  as  foreseen  in  White  Paper  programme. 
5.  Excise duties 
When  first  putting  forward  its  proposals  in  1972  for  harmonizing  the 
structures  of  excise  duties,  the  Commission  singled out for  retention  and 
harmonization  at  Community  level  the  excises  on  manufactured  tobacco, 
mineral  oils,  spirits,  wine  and  beer.  The  other  excise  duties  were  to  be 
phased  out  to  the  extent  that  they  involved  tax  adjustments  at  internal 
frontiers.  This  programme  had  as  its  ultimate  objective  the  creation  of 
conditions  permitting the abolition of fiscal  frontiers. 
This  objective  can,. of  course,  only  be  met  when  common  rates  of  excise 
duty  are  charged  on  harmonized  structures  throughout  the  Community.  The 
present  proposals,  put  forward  under  the  White  Paper  programme,  complete 
the  process  by  laying  down  the  common  rates  to  be  applied  to  those 
structures.  It  should  be  stressed,  however,  that very little progress has 
so  far  been  made  in  the  Council  towards  the  adoption  of the  Commission's 
structural  proposals.  Consequently,  the  considerations  in  respect  of  the 
excise  duties  are  more  complicated  than  those  in  respect  of  VAT  because 
not  only  the  rates  but  also  the  structures  still  differ  widely  between 
different Member  States. 
As  far  as  excise  duties  are  concerned,  any  flexibility  in  the  rates  of 
duty  which  might  be  permitted  would  be  compounded  with  the  permitted 
margin  for  VAT  rates  and  would  therefore  result  in  tax-induced  price 
... 
differentials  well  in  excess  of  5%.  This  is because  VAT  is  imposed  on  the 
price  of  goods  inclusive  of  excise  duty.  Consequently,  the  Commission  has 
proposed  that,  as  a  general  rule,  any  margin  of  flexibility  in 
approximating  rates  should  be  reserved  for  the  VAT  rates  because  these 
rates  have  by  far  the  widest  coverage  and  therefore  have  an  overriding '• 
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importance  for  Member  States'  budgets.  For  tobacco  products,  where  the 
Commission  is  proposing  a  composite  rate  for  the  ad-valorem  excise  duty 
and  VAT,  taken  together,  a  margin  of  flexibility  is  proposed  which  is 
equivalent  in  its  effect  on  retail  prices  to  the  margin  proposed  for  VAT 
on  other  goods.  More  generally  the  possibility  of  providing  a  margin  of 
flexibility  on  excise  duties  in  particular  cases  of  difficulty  would 
depend  on  whether it was  compatible with  the objective of the  abolition of 
frontier controls. 
As  regards  the  level  of  excise 
Member  States  is  much  greater 
rates,  the  present 
than  in  the  case 
divergence  between 
of  VAT  and  it  is 
consequently  that  much  more  difficult  to  arrive  at  an  optimal  solution 
which will  cause  the  least amount  of disturbance  to  the greatest  number  of 
Member  States.  Account  must  also  be  taken  of  other  Community  policies 
which  affect mineral  oils,  tobacco  products  and  alcoholic  beverages. 
In  determining  the  rates  the  Commission's  general  approach  has  been  to 
secure  equity  between  Member  States  and  the  minimum  disruption  in  each 
sector.  The  method  for  achieving  this  has  varied  according  to  the 
particular circumstances  or characteristics of each  sector  in  question. 
Accordingly,  in  the  case  of  tobacco  products  the  rates  have  been 
calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  Community  ad  thine tic  average  which  gives 
equal  weight  to  the  rates applied  by  each  Member  State.  The  resulting rate 
produces  an  increase  in  the  overall  taxation  of  manufactured  tobacco  at 
Community  level,  which  is  consistent  with  the  Commission's  policy  in 
health  matters,  set  out  in  the  report  to  Parliament  in  1982  (COM(82)61 
final)  and  in  the  Action  Programme:  "Europe  Against  Cancer"  (COM ( 86) 717 
final). 
The  alcoholic  drinks  sector  is  broadly  composed  of  two  categories  -
distilled  and  fermented  beverages.  For  the  former  (ie  spirits)  the 
Commission  has  taken  the  Community  arithmetic  average.  However  in  the  case 
of the  fermented  beverages  (wine  and  beer)  it was  found  that the effect of 
the  arithmetic  average,  and  also  of  an  average  weighted  by  consumption, 
would  be  highly  disruptive.  The  solution  proposed  for  these  products, 
which  are  in  competition,  is  therefore  to  tax  them  equally  per  litre of 
product  on  an  overall  revenue-neutral  basis. - 17  -
For  mineral  oils  the  Commission  is  proposing,  for  each  main  category  of 
product,  a  rate  which  minimises  disturbance  to  national  tax  revenues  or 
industrial  cost  patterns.  Thus  for  petrol  which  is  by  far  the  most 
important  producer  of  revenue  in  this  sector,  a  rate  based  on  the 
arithmetic  average  of  existing  rates  has  been  chosen.  For diesel,  heating 
gas  oil  and  heavy  fuel  oil  on  the  other  hand,  whose  use  is predominantly 
commercial,  the  Commission  considers  that  an  average  weighted  by 
consumption  would  be  more  appropriate,  as  it  minimizes  the  effects  on 
industrial  costs. 
On  the  basis  of  these  considerations  the  Commission  accordingly  proposes 
the  following rates: 
Alcoholic  drinks 
Alcohol  for  beverages 
(per hl of pure  alcohol) 
Intermediate  products  (per hl) 
Wine  (per hl)  average  11%  val) 
Beer  (per hl)  (average  12,5°  plato) 
Manufactured  tobaccos 
Cigarettes  (specific  excise  per  1000) 
ad  val  +  VAT  (in% of retail price) 
Cigars  and  cigarillos 
ad  val  +  VAT  (in %of retail price) 
Smoking  tobacco 
ad  val  +  VAT  (in% of retail price) 
Other  manufactured  tobacco 
ad  val  +  VAT  (in% of retail price) 
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Mineral  oils 
Petrol,  leaded,  and  medium  oils 
used  as  propellants,  per  1000  1 
Petrol,  unleaded  per  1000  1 
340  ECU 
310  ECU 
Liquified  petroleum  gas  (LPG)  per  1000  l  85  ECU 
Diesel  (gas-oil)  per  1000  1 
Heating gas-oil  and 
medium  oils used  as  fuels  other than 
propellants per  1000  1 
Heavy  fuel  oil  per  1000  kg 
177  ECU 
50  ECU 
17  ECU 
It should  be  noted  that  the  excise duties  proposed  above  are  based  on  the 
situation  as  at  1  April  1987.  Between  now  and  1992  the  amounts  of  the 
specific  duties  will  be  adapted  annually  by  the  Commission  in  accordance 
with  the  general  consumer  price  index  in  the  Community  and  the  revised 
figures  will  be  communicated  to  the  Member  States. 
6.  Overall  budgetary  effects 
As  indicated  previously,  the  Commission  has  kept  in  mind  in  formulating 
its  proposals  the  need  to  minimize  budgetary  disturbance  for  the  maximum 
number  of  Member  States. 
While  the  eventual  adjustments  which  may  be  needed  in  individual  Member 
States'  budgetary  arrangements  are  primarily  and  properly  a  matter  for 
the  Member  States concerned,  some  tentative global  qualitative  assessment 
of  the  likely'overall  effects  of  the  Commission's  proposals  can  be  given 
at  this  stage.  Any  quantitative  estimates  would  have  to  be  based  on 
purely  mechanical  calculations  which  could  not  take  account  of  the 
effects  of  changes  in  demand  which  tax  and  price  changes  may  generate 
(elasticity  effects);  or  of  the  effects  on  frontier  trade;  or  of  any 
macroeconomic  stabilising  mechanisms  which  may  operate  in  the  absence of compensatory  measures.  Taking 
principle  reduce  the  initial 
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such  effects  into  account  would  in 
budgetary  gains  or  losses  shown.  The 
Commission  is,  however,  very  conscious  that  in view  of the complexity of 
the  present  tax  rates  and  structures,  and  in  view  of  the  freedom  given  to 
the  Member  States  to determine  how  they  make  the fiscal  changes  they  need 
between  now  and  31  December  1992,  any  quantitative  estimate  of  these 
moderating  effects  would  be  particularly  difficult  and  unreliable.  In 
particular  an  in-depth  study  of  such  effects  would  require  a  prior 
knowledge  of the  nature  and  extent of any  compensatory  policies which  the 
Member  States might  adopt,  depending  on  their budgetary situation and  the 
use  they  make  of  indirect  taxation.  The  Commission  asked  for  such 
information  early  on  in  the  process of formulating its proposals  but  has 
had  only  an  inadequate  response.  The  task  of  evaluating  the  effects  of 
these  proposals  for  individual  Member  States is,  in  any  case,  primarily  a 
task  for  the  Member  States  themselves.  With  the  publication  of  the 
proposals,  that is  a  task  on  which  they  can  now  begin.  The  Commission  has 
already  undertaken  a  certain  amount  of exploratory  work  in collaboration 
with national  administrations.  It is  ready  to  pursue  these  studies and  to 
complete  them  on  the  basis of any  suggestions  which  the  Member  States  may 
submit  as  to  the  adjustments  they  may  consider desirable. 
Subject  to  these  qualifications,  it  seems  probable  that  three  Member 
States  (Belgium,  Italy,  the  Netherlands)  would  be  able  to  continue  to 
obtain  the  same  level  of  total  tax  revenue  from  the  VAT  and  excise  duty 
rates  proposed  as  they  currently receive.  One  Member  State  (France)  would 
suffer  a  slight  budgetary  loss,  while  three  Member  States  (Germany, 
United  Kingdom  and  Greece)  would  obtain  small  or  moderate  increases  in 
budgetary  receipts.  Two  Member  States  (Ireland  and  Denmark)  would  suffer 
pronounced  budgetary  losses,  while  the  other  Member  States  (Luxembourg, 
Spain  and  Portugal)  would  obtain  substantial  increases  in  budgetary 
receipts. 
7.  Timetable 
It is  intended  that  Community  rates  for  VAT  and  the  excise duties  should 
enter  into  force  no  later  than  31  December  1992.  It  will  be  the 
responsibility  of  the  individual  Member  States  to  work  towards  these 
rates  in the  intervening period.  The  Commission will  monitor  the progress '• 
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being  made  by  the  Member  States  and  will  report  periodically  ·to  the 
Council,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of Article 8R  of the  Treaty  as 
amended  by  the  Single  European  Act.  Such  reports will  consider  the  need 
for  proposals  for any complementary  amending  measures to take  account of econo-
mic  developments. 
Furthermore,  the  Commission  is  putting  forward  a  Convergence  Proposal 
which  replaces  the  standstill  proposal  currently  before  the  Council  (1). 
The  convergence  proposal,  which  covers  both  the  VAT  rates  and  the  main 
excise  duty  rates,  aims  to  ensure  that Member  States  do  not  diverge  from 
the  overall objective  in  the  meantime. 
8.  Conclusions 
The  abolition  of  fiscal  frontiers  is  a  vital  element  in  the  completion 
of  the  internal  market.  But  it will  also  be  an  achievement of incalcu-
lable  value  in  itself.  The  most  direct  and  immediate  benefit  would 
accrue  to  industry  and  commerce  as  the  administrative  cost  of  fiscal 
frontier  formalities  virtually  disappeared  and  the  time  spent  in 
transporting  goods  was  reduced.  Relieved  of  those  costs,  firms  in  the 
Community  would  become  more  price-competitive  both  within  the  internal 
market  and  internationally.  That  in  itself  would  increase  their 
potential  market  and  lead  to  economies  of  scale  in  production.  These, 
together  with  the  reduction  in  administrative costs,  would  be  reflected 
in  lower  prices  for  the  consumer.  Real  domestic  demand  in  the  Community 
would  rise,  with  favourable  effects  on  GOP  growth.  And,  of  course,  the 
cost  of  frontier  controls  to  member  governments  would  be  reduced. 
Frontier  controls  for  fiscal  reasons  constitute  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  such  controls.  A  Community  in  which  it  was  no  longer 
necessary  for  the  citizen  to  worry  about  whether  or not he  had  exceeded 
his  travellers'  allowance  or  whether  he  could  drive  his  car  into  one 
Member  State  or  another;  a  Community  in which  traders  could  do  business 
with  customers  in  other  Member  States just as  they  do  with  customers  in 
the  next  street  or  the  next  town;  a  Community  in  which  there  would  no 
longer  be  the  endless  queueing  and  form-filling  and  rubber-stamping  at 
frontier  posts;  a  Community  in  which  goods  and  services  no  longer bore 
the  extra  and  unnecessary  cost  of  delay  and  bureaucracy;  such  a 
Community  is  well  worth  the  effort  on  all  sides  that  the  Commission's 
proposals  will  undoubtedly  require. 
(1)  COM(85)  606  as  amended  by  COM(87)  17 - 21  -
That  effort,  the  Commission  acknowledges,  will  be  a  considerable  one. 
The  Commission  has  done  as  much  as  possible  to  minimise  it,  but  is 
nevertheless  well  aware  that  for  some  Member  States  the  measures 
proposed  will  create  problems,  even  though -they  allow  a  degree  of 
flexibility  and  a  reasonable  period  for  adjustment  (i.e., until  the  end 
of  1992).  The  Commission  has,  therefore,  always  acknowledged  that there 
may  be  a  need  for  derogations  since  these difficulties cannot  be  allowed 
to  jeopardize  the  fundamental  objective  of  creating  a  single  European 
market.  Nevertheless,  it  is  in  the  general  interests  of  the  Community 
that  such  derogations  should  be  kept  to  the  minimum. 
The  Commission  is  nonetheless  convinced  that  the  present  proposals  for 
the  approximation of the  VAT  and  excise rates,  taken  in conjunction with 
the  proposals  already  on  the  table,  will  serve  two  major  purposes.  They 
will  firstly  permit  the  abolition  of  fiscal  frontiers;  they  will  thus 
contribute  towards  the  attainment  of  an  integrated  and  expanding 
European  economy.  They  will  also  satisfy,  so  far  as  possible,  the 
legitimate  concern  of  individual  Member  States  that  their  existing 
economic  and  taxation  systems  should  not  be  unduly  disrupted. - 22  -
·ANNEX  A 
PROPOSALS  TO  BE  SUBMITTED  IN  CONNECTION  WITH 
THE  APPROXIMATION  OF  INDIRECT  TAX  RATES  AND 
HARMONIZATION  OF  INDIRECT  TAX  STRUCTURES 
A)  VAT 
1)  Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  supplementing  the  Common  System 
of  Value  Added  Tax  and  amending  Directive  77/388/EEC  - approxi-
mation of VAT  rates.  COM(87)  321 
2)  Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  supplementing  the  Common  System 
of  Value  Added  Tax  and  amending  Directive  77/388/EEC  - Abolition 
of Fiscal  Frontiers.  COM(87)  322 
3)  Outline  Working  Paper  for  a  Community  VAT  clearing  mechanism. 
COM(87)  323 
4)  Proposal  for  a  Council 
convergence  of  rates  of 
COM( 87)  324 
B)  EXCISES 
Directive  instituting 
value  added  tax  and 
a  process  of 
excise  duties. 
1)  Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  concerning  the  approximation  of 
taxes  on  cigarettes.  COM(87)  325 
2)  Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  concerning  the  approximation  of 
taxes  on  manufactured  tobacco  other  than  cigarettes.  COM(87)  326 
3)  Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  concerning  approximation  of  the 
rates of  excise  duty  on  mineral oils.  COM(87)  327 
4)  Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  concerning  approximation  of  the 
rates  of  excise  duty  on  alcoholic  beverages  and  on  the  alcohol 
contained  in  other  products.  COM(87)  328 